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David Cameron, the UK’s Prime Minister, 
has set out his objectives for EU reforms 
in a speech at Chatham House on 10 
November 2015 – objectives which 
he later clarified in a letter to the 
President of the European Council 
Donald Tusk. Cameron’s demands fall 
in four categories – i) safeguarding 
Britain’s position in the Union’s ‘variable 
geometry’ ;  i i )  strengthening the 
competitiveness of the Union’s internal 
market; iii) bolstering the democratic 
authority of the EU by strengthening 
the role of national parliaments in the 
EU’s decision-making process; and iv) 
ensure changes to the principles of 
free movement and equal treatment 
of Union citizens in access to welfare 
systems in the host state. Each of these 
objectives differ quite significantly in 
terms of political feasibility and legal 
implication. More crucially, each can 
be interpreted and implemented in 
different ways. Generally, it seems, 
Cameron is attempting to present 
reforms that both address British 
domestic issues and strengthen the EU’s 
functioning. 
The Union’s variable 
geometry
Cameron’s concern is mainly with the 
relationship between Eurozone states 
and non-Eurozone states. He wants to 
“make sure that these changes [to the 
Eurozone] will respect the integrity of 
the Single Market, and the legitimate 
interests of non-Euro members.” This 
is not without reason. As the EU tries 
to ‘solve’ the Euro-crisis, there has been 
significant deepening of integration in 
the Eurozone, which is moving towards 
overs ight and coordinat ion (and 
possibly, in the future, harmonisation) 
of national social, fiscal and welfare 
policies. Cameron’s real problem lies 
in the fact that the Eurozone Member 
States have an in-built qualified majority 
in the Council. In other words, if all 
Eurozone states agree to a measure 
within the EU single market, the UK 
can’t do anything about it. The fear is 
that – as integration in the Eurozone 
deepens to include welfare, labour, and 
economic policies – this will require 
changes to the rules, structures and 
institutions of the EU single market, 
which will also affect non-Eurozone 
states. Problematically, however, those 
states risk being structurally outvoted 
in the Council. Cameron sets out 
seven principles that serve to prevent 
this process. Most are easily achieved 
through protocols and (cosmetic) 
changes to the preamble of the Treaty. 
Cameron seems to also suggest an 
‘opt-out’ of further market integration 
measures that are primarily relevant 
for the Eurozone states, such as the 
creation of a Banking Union. This 
should not be too difficult to secure. 
Short of creating a ‘double majority’ 
of both Eurozone and non-Eurozone 
states before an EU law can be passed 
(something discussed in the run-up 
to Cameron’s speech, but which was 
not included), there is not much in 
Cameron’s plan that would actually 
prevent the problem of Eurozone politics 
spilling over into the functioning of the 
single market. Perhaps an elegant and 
innovative solution can be found by the 
legal technicians. One example could be 
replacing the current legal basis for the 
functioning of the single market (Article 
114 TFEU) with a number of more 
specific and detailed legal bases – be it 
sectoral or based on policy proximity – 
and offering the UK an opt-out or opt-in 
over the ones it finds most problematic 
(presumably financial services and 
social policy considerations). This 
would require Treaty change and 
significant legal tinkering, but is not 
impossible to achieve, primarily because 
it protects both the interest of the UK 
and the preference of other Member 
States to deepen their cooperation. 
The Union’s competitiveness
Cameron’s second heading for reform is 
less specific and less legally complicated. 
He stresses the need for the EU to be 
“more competitive”, and highlights 
the need to create a single digital 
market, a Capital Markets Union, the 
cutting of red tape, and calls on the EU 
to “fulfil its commitment to the free 
flow of capital, goods and services”. 
Notably, the fourth freedom in EU 
law is missing here: the free flow of 
citizens and workers. These demands 
are arguably already being met by the 
EU. Vice-President of the Commission 
Frans Timmermans has been actively 
trying to make sure that the EU ‘does 
more on the big things, and less on the 
small things.’ For instance, he is limiting 
the number of legislative proposals 
emanating from the Commission; the 
files for the single digital market and the 
Capital Markets Union are making their 
way through the legislative process; 
and the EU is negotiating a new trade 
and investment agreement with the US. 
Ultimately, however, whether or not the 
EU will ‘deliver’ on this is a question 
of politics: as long as the Council and 
EP are dominated by right-of-centre 
political groups, these proposals should 
pass relatively easily. The achievement 
of this second set of demands, then, 
might be an easy win for Cameron – 
and does not require further protocols, 
negot iat ions or  Treaty  changes. 
Problematically for those who oppose 
the policy preferences of Cameron (both 
domestically and in Europe), this second 
heading for reform may be one in which 
other (left-of-centre) domestic leaders 
may be forced to compromise on. Given 
the difficulty of repealing or amending 
existing EU laws, this may make the EU 
even more neo-liberal than its critics 
argue it already is. 
Democratic authority in the 
future of the EU
Here Cameron’s intentions are clear. He 
wants freedom from the UK’s obligation 
to work towards an “ever closer Union” 
as set out in the Treaty; to strengthen 
the role of national parliaments in the 
EU legislative process; and to bolster 
the functioning of the principle of 
subsidiarity. The first demand will not 
be a problem. The term ‘ever closer 
Union’ is nothing but a symbolic one – 
and allowing the UK to opt-out by way 
of a protocol attached to the Treaty will 
not be a major political or legal issue. 
Cameron’s second demand is relatively 
general. He stresses the need to involve 
national parliaments in EU law-making, 
“proposing a new arrangement where 
groups of national parliaments, acting 
together, can stop unwanted legislative 
proposals.” This appears to alter the 
role of national parliaments – which 
now have the capacity to issue a 
‘yellow’ or ‘orange’ card when they 
feel a Commission proposal violates the 
principle of subsidiarity. Cameron’s letter 
suggests that he wishes to introduce a 
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‘red card’, whereby national parliaments 
can uncondit ional ly block pol icy 
proposals. He seems to suggest that 
national parliaments ought to assess 
the substantive merit of the proposal, 
rather than only its compliance with 
the principle of subsidiarity. In reality, 
research suggests  that  nat iona l 
parliaments already assess the normative 
and substantive merit of proposals 
rather than their compliance with 
subsidiarity. Additionally, most ‘yellow’ 
and ‘orange’ cards will, in practice, be 
‘red cards’ given the unlikelihood of 
the Commission securing a qualified 
majority in the Council where national 
parliaments object to a proposal. In 
Cameron’s view (which is shared by 
some academics), enhancing national 
parliaments’ role in the EU serves to 
bolster the EU’s democratic authority. 
However, simply strengthening the 
capacity of some national parliaments 
to say ‘no’ does not get us very far. It 
strengthens the incentives for national 
parliaments to protect national interest, 
creates negative politics and does not 
allow for substantive and inclusive 
discussion of EU politics. Moreover, it 
is not much used: only two proposals 
have been ‘yellow-carded’ since the 
introduction of this practice. An 
alternative way of strengthening the 
role of national parliaments might 
be to suggest that if more than half 
of the total number of national MPs 
across the 28 Member States (rather 
than half of national parliaments) 
vote against a Commission proposal, 
it should be abandoned. This would 
strengthen national oppositions (rather 
than playing in the hands of majorities 
that already control the Council in 
the EU), allow for the formation of 
cross-national political alliances, and 
strengthen the politicisation of EU 
policies along left-right cleavages, rather 
than national cleavages. Changes to the 
role of national parliaments could, to 
some extent, be achieved by amending 
Protocols 1 and 2 attached to the 
Treaty of Lisbon – and more structurally 
by writing their role into the ordinary 
legislative procedure by way of a Treaty 
revision. 
Welfare benefits and free 
movement
The most significant and substantive 
proposals seek to reform inter-migration 
within the EU and access to welfare 
benefits for EU citizens in their host 
state. Cameron proposes that this 
will relieve pressure on public services 
and “restore a sense of fairness” to 
the migration structure. In practice, 
he proposes four specific steps. The 
first step is tackling ‘abuse’ of EU free 
movement law. The second step aims 
to prevent the fact that it’s easier for an 
EU citizen to bring a non-EU spouse into 
the UK that it is for a UK national. Third, 
EU citizens must have lived and worked 
in the UK for four years before they 
can access in-work benefits. Fourth, 
child benefits should only be available 
for resident families, and cannot be 
sent back to the state of origin, where 
the child of a migrant worker resides. 
The first and fourth of these can, and 
probably will, be met. The need to 
prevent abuse of free movement law is 
accepted as a political priority by most 
Member States, and the Commission 
supports it as well. The case law of the 
European Court of Justice, moreover, 
allows for such measures. The non-
exportability of childcare benefits is a 
minor, but highly symbolic issue. At 
the moment, child care benefits are 
typically accrued in the country where 
(one of the) parents work, even if 
the child resides in another country. 
Changing this rule of allocation, so that 
child benefits are exclusively paid by 
the country in which the child resides, 
regardless of the place of employment 
of the parents, would require amending 
or adding provisions in secondary EU 
legislation, which requires agreement 
between Commission, Council and EP. 
Given the limited nature of Cameron’s 
request, and the consensus between 
dominant states about this issue, it 
could well be one of the compromises 
that can be reached (even if resistance 
from the EP is to be expected). The 
second and third demands of Cameron’s 
list are much more difficult to achieve. 
Both the right for EU citizens to enter 
another EU state with their non-EU 
spouse, and the unconditional right to 
welfare benefits for EU citizens who 
work in their host state, derive from 
EU Treaty law directly (Articles 18, 21 
and 45 TFEU). These provisions of free 
movement of workers and citizens, as 
well as the rule of non-discrimination 
based on nationality are central to the 
EU project, both symbolically, politically, 
and legally. Changing these rules would 
require unanimous support between 
the Member States and  between 
all national parliaments. It is highly 
unlikely that all these actors are willing 
to rethink the conceptual and normative 
foundation of the Union’s project in 
order to appease Cameron’s domestic 
political problems. Slightly more feasible 
might be a re-think of the general 
and overall allocation of responsibility 
between host and home state of the 
migrant. Rather than forcing the host 
state to address the welfare needs of 
the migrant citizen, it may be his home 
state that offers the migrant welfare 
benefits for the first number of years. 
This may be a more structural way of 
addressing Cameron’s issue without 
limiting the free movement provisions. 
However, this – again – would require 
unanimity between the Member States, 
and might not significantly reduce the 
burden on Britain’s welfare system, 
given the high number of (pension-
aged) Brits that reside abroad. Any 
other solution – such as changes to 
the Citizens’ Directive or Social Security 
Regulation which implement rather 
general and vague Treaty provisions 
or any limitation of the power of the 
European Court of Justice – would 
require collaboration of Commission 
and EP/This is highly unlikely, and 
would not be “legally-binding and 
irreversible” given that the European 
Court of Justice can test the conformity 
of these solutions to primary EU Treaty 
law. In fact, part of the problem is the 
UK’s structure of ‘in-work benefits’. EU 
law suggests that workers have to be 
always treated equally when accessing 
welfare benefits, while access to welfare 
benefits for economically inactive 
migrants can be made conditional 
upon a period of residence. Yet, the 
UK’s welfare structure does not allow 
Cameron to make use of this legal 
possibility. 
Conclusion
Cameron’s demands for reform of the 
EU in the run-up to the British in/out 
referendum cover a range of different 
issues with the EU’s set-up. In general 
terms, Cameron can expect a lot of 
goodwill from the heads of state in the 
EU partners and the EU institutions in 
making certain symbolic changes (such 
as the opt-out of the commitment to an 
‘ever closer union’), and certain limited 
institutional and policy reforms (such 
as strengthening the competitiveness 
of the internal market or limiting the 
exportability of child-care benefits). 
More fundamental changes to the 
way in which the EU functions include 
proposed changes to the basic principles 
of single market policy making, free 
movement and equal treatment, and 
the role of national parliaments in the 
EU’s legislative process.  This is only 
achievable if negotiators can frame the 
reforms in such a way that addresses 
Cameron’s needs without limiting the 
capacity of other institutions, states, 
and citizens to enjoy their rights under 
EU law. 
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